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In this paper we try to understand the consequences of the active intervention of the
Central  Banks  in  the  economy and  the  reasons  behind  it.  We’ll  pass  through  the
Spanish economy from 2000 to 2016 and many macroeconomic aspects, like inflation,
interest rate, bank credit or housing prices, to form a general view of the evolution of
the crises and try to find out the causes and consequences of it. We will explain our
thesis helping us with the Trade Cycle of the Austrian Economic School. At the end I’ll
propose some possible solutions to the problematic. 
JEL code: B25, B53, E58, N14 Europa
Keywords: Central Bank, QE, inflation, credit expansion, Fractional-Reserve banking. 
1
INDEX
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................4
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................5
3. INFLATION AND CREDIT EXPANSION .........................................8
4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS .............................................................15
5. THE WORLD WITHOUT CENTRAL BANKS AND FRATIONAL-
RESERVE BANKING .....................................................................23
5. 1.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS .......................................................23
6. FINAL CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................26
APPENDIX ..........................................................................................28
REFERENCES ...................................................................................29
2
FIGURES’ INDEX
Figure 1. - The share of bank credit over industries, showing the crowding
out effect ..................................................................................................6
Figure 2.-  Inflation Chart ............................................................................10
Figure 3. - Spanish Price Index since January 2002 until May 2017 ...........11
Figure 4. - Interest rates ..............................................................................12
Figure 5 and 6. - Credit to GDP, total credit to the private non-financial sector
for Spain and Germany ..........................................................................15
Figure 7. - Number of new houses in Spain ................................................16
Figure 8. - Property prices in Spain .............................................................17
Figure 9. - Property prices in Germany .......................................................17
Figure 10. - Consumer prices in Spain ........................................................18
Figure 11. - Consumer prices in Germany ..................................................18
Figure 12. - Household debt in Spain ..........................................................20
Figure 13. - Gini Index, including all industries ............................................20
Figure 14. - Expansion stages .....................................................................22
TABLES’ INDEX
Table 1. - Stages of monetary expansion ..........................................28
3
THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANK AND TRADE CYCLE:
EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH ECONOMY
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we try to understand the role of bank credit in the economy, and more
concretely, the consequences in Spain. We are interested in the effects of the policies
adopted by the Spanish government and the European Central Bank since 2000 and
how affected in the economic boom until 2007 and the following economic crisis. To
understand this we are going to explain the Economic Cycle of the Austrian School of
Economics and we will reinforce the arguments with the data. 
We will analyze the Spanish macro economy and how the policies adopted in the
past decades are completely wrong to obtain positive and sustainable results. Finally
we will put the focus on the performance of the European Central Bank and how the
system  banking  is  taking  advantage  of  the  fractional-reserve  banking  in  their  own
interest at expense of the people unknowingly, and how we could find a solution to this
problematic. 
My interest for the Austrian School of economics started in 2015 with a conference
of Juan Ramón Rallo in the faculty of Economics on University Jaume I of Castellón,
Spain.  In  that  moment  I  had  a  mentality  closed  with  my  studies  in  college  of
Keynesianism and neo-classical economy, that conference shocked me. It was based
on demystify the economic program of a national party with a great boom in these
years.  Since  that  moment  my  critical  thought  about  the  ‘mainstream’  economy
appeared and I started to study and investigate for my own more about this School. My
first steps were the books of two recognized Spanish economists like J. R. Rallo and
Daniel Lacalle, and later I approached to two fathers of the Austrian School, F. Hayek
and L. von Mises. I have to remark the difficulty doing this project because I haven’t
much  information  about  the  Austrian  School  of  Economics  in  the  University  and
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basically it’s been straight ahead by own-initiative. On the occasion, I show gratitude to
my tutor for invaluable debates in class and supporting in this project.    
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Bank loans are the most important source of finance in the EU. The predominant
transmission of risk in the current monetary system it’s thanks to bank loans, putting in
contact the people who save their money to other people who need this capital to kick
off their personal projects, called capitalists. Banking system put in contacts both sides
of  the  equation  to  make  sure  that  the  biggest  part  of  the  capital  it’s  been  used,
obtaining returns for this activity. The problem appears when in periods of panic the
depositors want to come back their savings and the bank don’t have it. That’s caused
by the fractional-reserve banking system dominates the world economy. 
For  the  Austrian  School  that  it’s  one  of  the  most  dangerous  problems  in  the
economy because it violate the principle of private-property rights and the deposits are
not supported by a monetary base. The other one is the politic of “easy money”, the
manipulation of the interests by all central banks, creating instability in the prices and
investment in the real economy. 
In 1912 Ludwig von Mises created the Theory of the Cycle in his book The Theory
of Money and Credit.  It was a revolution because the theorist before thought that the
cycles lasted around 30 or 40 years. Mises didn’t focus in the timeline of crisis, rather in
the  fundamentals  and  the  consequences  of  them  in  the  economy.  The  artificial
reduction of the interest by the central banks boost the entrepreneurs and investors to
perform new investment projects that before doesn’t be profitable thanks to the high
interests, giving a bad allocation of the available resources. This reduction of interests
it’s not created by the interaction between supply and demand of the economy, the
consumers  and  the  savers,  it’s  created  by  an  external  organism  creating  deep
distortions.  The  clue  is  that  the  entrepreneur  needs  to  know  the  changes  in  the
conditions  of  the  market  and  the  relatives  changes  in  the  demand  of  goods  and
services,  also  anticipate  the  politics  of  the  central  bank  for  inject  liquidity  in  the
economy, or not. 
We can see that if the Central Bank injects more money than the economy requires
the harmony between consumption and saving breaks and it  start a period of over-
indebtedness. Increases deposits in banks, and start a new expansion of the credit by
the intermediaries. That increase the capacity of demand, buying goods and services
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than they don’t need before if the expansion of the credit had not occurred. In the worst
of the cases it traduces in buying new properties.  
The Spanish economy it’s no different than other ones. With an increase of the
bank loans1 and their rates collapse, the credit goes to the sector that it’s suffering an
inflationary  spiral,  the  construction,  and  housing  prices  raise.  Notice  that  the
entrepreneur has the labor of keep an eye on the demand of the economy and the
movements. The chief of construction had to attend the demand of the houses that it’s
producing in the economy, despite of he is conscious of the easy money is passenger,
or maybe he doesn’t know it and go up in the race. Anyway, the entrepreneur had to
attend the demand, or he is get out of the market and condemned to fail.  It’s all  or
nothing. 
Since  2000  the  banks  are  aggressively  financing  housing,  creating  great
disequilibrium in the market economy. The prices in the houses grow up creating profits
for  the companies,  and then,  the interests push up since 20062.  As we can see in
Figure 1 the construction sector was concentrating more share of bank credit until 55%
of them, meanwhile in 1999 it were only the 30% of the share. Then, after 2006 the
share of bank credit came back to levels of 1999. 
1  See the annual report of Banco de España. Page 33, chart 2.1; available at: 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesAnuales/InformesAnua
les/12/Files/inf2012e.pdf
2 See  the  annual  report  of  ECB,  chart  C25  Euro  area  money  market  rates  at:
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=10000048
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Figure 1: The share of bank credit over industries, showing the crowding out effect.
It’s not casual that the period of biggest share appears when the returns of the
capital  slow  down.  In  this  moment,  when  the  politic  of  easy  money  reverses,  the
transference  of  founds  stop,  decreasing  the  demand  of  the  less  essential  goods,
paralyzing the investment projects. In this moment start the recession of the cycle. The
monetary expansion  origins  also  the reduction  of  the  real  founds in  the  economy,
because is wasted in consumption not sustainable in the production along the time.   
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3. INFLATION AND CREDIT EXPANSION
Since the creation of the European Central Bank, the European bureaucracy has
imposed by themselves the control of the inflation between rates of -2 and +2%, scared
by the hyperinflation suffered in 1923 by the Republic of Weimar in Germany. Their
objective is to maintain the stability of the prices, the exchange of the currency, the
execution  of  the monetary policy and the stability of  the financial  markets.  For this
reasons the ECB has the power to control the quantity of money in circulation, the
credit and the deposits. 
The problem from a perspective of Austrian School is that these issues it’s had to
be solved by the free market and not from a central institution. As we could observe in
the Figure 1, control of the interest of credit and deposits cause bad allocation of the
money in circulation. Without the control of Central Banks the interest of deposits and
credit it’s established by the interaction between supply and demand of money. The
free market regulates himself because without the ECB injection of money the financial
markets had to be more careful to deliver credit to enterprises who has huge problems
of solvency, avoiding the concentration of the credit bank in few companies.  
 “Inflation is that policy which by increasing the quantity of money or credit seeks to
raise money prices and money wages or seeks to counteract a deadline of money
prices and money wages which threatens as the result of an increase in the supply of
consumers ‘goods”, Mises said it in  Interventionism. As the contrary of many people
think,  lower  interest  rates  and  inflation  don’t  benefit  the  immense  majority  (worker
people,  professionals  and  middle  classes)  at  the  expense  of  a  small  minority  of
capitalist,  the  entrepreneurs  and  credit  institutions.  Nowadays,  in  the  times  of
debentures, saving banks and social security they are creditors, and the “tax in the
shadow”, how many economists called the inflation, reduce their currency purchasing
power.  
It’s easy to say that the inflation is caused by the increase in the volume of
money, and that’s not the only reason. The value of the money is correlated with the
expectations of the future supply of the currency, if people think that the Central Bank
is going to print money or the supply of money increases because it’s a period of stable
growth,  the  value  of  the  money  decreases.  Then,  the  real  value  of  the  currency
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depends not merely on the quantity of liquid money in circulation, also their quality. The
quality of a currency is explained by how the investors appreciate that the Government
could collect taxation in the future, because the national currency it’s always used to do
it. So, strong currency had a positive correlation with a strong government that can
provide security  to  pay debt.  Best  examples  are  United States  and Europe,  which
accumulation of public debt is around 100% and 86%, respectively. The confidence of
the markets in these economies, the most solvent in the world, makes that the flow of
money  don’t  stop  the  refinancing  of  debt  with  a  very  profitable  interests.   Strong
currency permits maintain the confidence of the markets, but also could be that it’s
overrated. In this case, the inflationist pressure about the economy is huge, and the
prices has a quickly increase along the time. As a consequence, consumers need more
units of the currency for buy the same product than before. So, the most harmed it’s
the consumers, the poor and middle class, which see his power of purchasing is lower. 
Another reason is the increase on prices, but not inflationary. It could be that the
economy it’s collapsing, like always happened in a period of war, before the Central
Bank print  money to pay the liabilities  and put  the  whole  economy at  his  service,
always had a problem with the shortage of goods. In this case, when the demand of the
goods are increasing to satisfy their necessities but the real goods are not increasing at
the same level, or even are reducing it, the result is an increase in the price of goods.
In fact, that happened when States, kings, or the institutions in front of the country
along the history take the control of the economy and force the companies to fulfill their
demands. The bad allocation of economic resources, the human capital, the stoppage
of cooperation between consumers and entrepreneurs, provokes a destruction of the
economy, and nobody can avoid the inevitable end: hyperinflation. The best example of
it  is  the hyperinflation of  the Weimar Republic,  in 1923.  We can’t  avoid the rule of
supply  and  demand in  economy because  it’s  always  working,  and  denying  it  only
causes a bad allocation of the economic resources and crisis. 
In the figure 2 we can observe the inflation of the European countries since 1999,
where the inflation increases every year around 1-3 per cent until the crush in 2008,
when the financial crisis explode in Europe and infect the system. 2008 is the highest
pick  in  the  chart,  reaching  the 4% for  making the huge drop in  the  whole  period,
arriving until -0,5% of inflation. 
The increasing inflation  it’s  in  great  part  cause of  an increase of  the supply  of
money and credit, especially when that increase is not supported with an increase of
the  reserve  of  monetary  bases.  Central  Bank  blown  up  the  volume  of  money  in
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circulation  with  the  excuse  of  enters  in  a  deflationary  spiral.   As  a  consequence,
increased the amount of money of the people, and then, increase the supply of the
goods as a consequence. How the supply of goods didn’t increase in the same way
than the supply of money, the prices go up. The injections in the economy of money
paper  provoke  a  reduction  of  the  value  of  each  dollar,  euro,  or  national  currency,
because the relative value of  each one is less.  With the abundance of  money,  the
prices rise to attend the demand. 
Figure 2: Inflation Chart. Source: http://www.ecb.europa.eu
As we said before, the Central Bank has been intervened in the economy to avoid
excessive volatility in the inflation, and then, the changes in prices. The meaning of the
figure 2 is that in this period, almost two decades since 1999, the citizens are losing
purchase  power,  because  the  prices  of  the  products  and  services  are  increasing
consequence of the inflation, but the salaries are not.  The inflation in this period is
around 1-1,5%, so prices continued the increase in the Eurozone.  
In the case of the Spain, in only 15 years the prices on consumption in Spain have
raised  25  points,  in  other  words,  the  prices  had  raised  a  25%.  We had  a  period
between 2015 and beginning of 2017 when the prices were lower basically caused by
the minimum price of petrol in 2016, around 30$. So, the prices of the energy push the
prices into the general level. Generally, the CPI is a good proxy for the inflation, so we
will combine these two variables in the study. 
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Figure 3: Spanish Price Index since January 2002 until May 2017. Source: www.ine.es
The differential  between  Europe  and  Spain  it’s  about  a  1% on  inflation3,  in
periods of continue growth, Spain generates more inflation in the prices than the rest of
the Europe, basically, for the great influence of the energy in the country. 
After the year 2010,  in many countries in Europe and the world,  take place
another recession extending the crisis that affected with anger the banking system.
Many  banks  in  Spain,  almost  them  old  saving  banks,  passed  a  great  problem  of
liquidity and solvency. The solvency of the European banking system was in danger
because it was expanding through them, the risk prime take off in the most affected
countries,  like  Greece,  Spain,  Portugal,  or  Ireland.  In  that  moment  the  European
Central  Bank had to intervene injecting  hundred millions  of  Euros to rescue banks
because  the  problematic  of  get  finance  in  the  markets.  After  2012  Europe  get
immersed in a period of stagnation of the economy. After a few years of crisis, citizens
saw a reduction of the wages and the increase of the unemployment. Banks stopped to
provided finance families and small companies. The great default of them during crisis
gets the banks taking fewer risks for the loans, so the investment in the productivity
economy was replaced by the public debt. 
3 See the quarterly inform of UFM Market Trends: https://trends.ufm.edu/informe/la-amenaza-
inflacionaria/
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Spanish  public  sector  was  so  productive  during  the  real-state  bubble  and
received a lot  of  artificial  revenues. Instead of save them to subsequent periods of
crisis, the government refinanced the debt sending bonds, and increasing the waste in
the “Walfare State”. The irresponsibility was in first place of the banks, giving credit
without control; even include families and companies of doubtful debts. Second place,
the government that permitted the overinvestment in industries like construction without
value-added.  The consequence was a crisis  in  the system banking,  with a general
default in all the economy, completely necessary after years of bad over-investment.
Most  entrepreneurs  were  confused by low interest  rates  stimulated by  the Central
Bank, making a lot of projects profitable when it weren’t real, how we could see after
the crisis, when the interest pick up. In the Figure 4 we can see the evolution of the
interests in Europe since 1999:
Figure 4: Interest rates
In the beginnings of the 20th century started the crisis named ‘.com’, because
many companies raised their prices in the markets so quickly based only in the used of
Internet.  As always,  a speculative  bubble  appears because the traders and capital
funds invest  in  the  markets  to  obtain  profits.  In  the  same way,  in  2007  burst  the
subprime crisis in US, spreading to all the markets. Both cases affected the interest
rates in the same way: the Central Bank push up the interest rate. The risk of non-
payment it’s too obvious, and banks stop the flow of credit like this, pushing up the
interest. This permit obtains more benefits for the olds credits to recover the default of
families and companies can’t pay, in other words, banks need to recover the solvency
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and liquidity of the entity. With high interest, the overinvestment is forced to reduced
and start a period for reorganized the resources of activity productive. Families started
to save money and capitalize it after a boom of investment. 
After 2010 the banking system has been in danger constantly with the rescue of
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. To healthy it, the European Central Bank injected
millions of euros of liquidity to avoid a generally bankruptcy,  that put in danger the
entire Eurozone and the rest of the world. The path taken after this crisis it’s different
than the others before. Since 2012 the inflation started to sunk down into levels around
0%. That’s  not  an appropriate scenario for  a quickly  growth “necessary”  in  the old
continent, with great unemployment and quantities of debt never seen in history. There
is an idea that monetary authorities have the power  to guarantee high employment
through the inflation,  then, public  opinion is favorable to use it.  Inflation could be a
temporary  stimulating  effect,  but  in  the  long  run  provokes  bad  adjustment  of  the
problems.  To guarantee this effect along the time is necessary increase inflation over
time,  and we  all  know the problems of  this  in  1920’s  by  Germany.  That  policy  of
creating inflation is not sustainable in the long run. 
So, from the point of view of continue reduction of inflation since 2012, until
-0,5%,  the  Central  Bank  started  the  Quantitative  Easing  in  March  of  2015.  The
Quantitative Easing is a program of stimulus created to buy banking assets, mostly
public debt in mode of investment. Banks bought lot of public debt during the crisis
cause  the  increase  of  the  risk  premium,  and  the  returns  turned  so  profitable,
considering that a European country with so many countries supporting their balances
it’s difficult that enter in a bankruptcy. Then, European Central Bank buys that public
debt of the private banks, achieving a injection of liquidity, cleaning up their balances
and changing the credit in long run of Public Treasure by cash that could be used at
the moment. 
Quantitative  Easing  had  many  consequences  in  the  economy.  First  of  all,
interest rate shrank down, as we can see in figure 3; when the tittles of debt increased,
the interest of public debt decreases because incentives the demand of them, and the
prices increase, projecting confidence in the system. Also, the entities which central
bank buy their duty had now a better cost of financing. At the same time, other assets
like corporate shares are more attractive and relativity cheaper, helping to invest in the
real economy. 
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Thanks to the reduction of interest rates and the injection of the liquidity,  the
banks could increase credits to the families and the economy because the public bonds
are not so profitable, and then, banks assume more risks, reducing again the rates of
private interest. That combination should provide people enough confidence to restart
investing and consume again, reactivating the economy, increasing prices, inflation and
leaving behind the ghosts of the crisis. 
Other of the consequences is the depreciation of the currency, Central Bank is
injecting liquidity in the economy, so every euro is losing value because the increase of
the quantity on money in circulation and monetary base, and the markets receive this
information and sell Euros decreasing his value, to buy other currency’s, how it could
be dollars, yens or pounds. The positive effect is the competitively of the currency, and
then,  the increase of the exportations,  because they are cheaper respect  the other
currency’s, helping to improve the commercial balances. 
With this point of view, the effects of the QE proportionate cheap credit, more
domestic spending,  increasing of  prices,  inflation,  and depreciation  of  the currency,
giving the Eurozone a perfect scenario for economic growth and confidence to invest,
consume, borrow and contract labor force.  Giving these results, it seems the perfect
receipt to get out of the crisis in a few years,  even months meanwhile Quantitative
Easing injects in the economy enough liquidity. But it has two problems: first, the QE is
an measure that it could only used after a crisis, or recessions, because if the economy
is growing up  banks can send credits, families and companies are borrowing, the QE
could have negative effects, pushing up prices and inflation more than the economy
can resist.  Second one,  the strategy for  when  stop the QE it’s  not  clear  even for
experts. 
The big trouble in that crisis is an economy over-indebt in all sectors: families,
private sector and public sector. So, the QE injects in 2015 billions of liquidity in the
banking  system  to  extend  it  to  the  economy,  but  Spain  is  passing  a  period  of
recovering the finance stability,  repaying their debts after an insane bubble of false
euphoria. The most interested in continue spending over their possibilities is the State,
because after a great hole in their budgets that the European Union permit, the Central
Bank come and rescue them to avoid a worst situation. In this situation, the only one
who is harmed is the taxpayer, who sees that the next generations will pay the overrun
of the deficit  in the next  decades.  If  families and companies are recovering of the
indebt  lower  interests  are  not  going  to  change  nothing,  they  are  not  going  to  let
themselves go again. Then, the result of this situation is that banks are keeping the
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excess of liquidity in their reserves, not sending more credit, because the risk is still
high. 
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The modern banking system is based in the fractionary reserve, and the culture
of debt creates growth and prosperity. It’s not surprising that in a period of crisis, like
2008  everyone  attack  the  capitalism  and  how  it  gave  this  system,  with  recurrent
periods of crisis and recession in a short timeline.  To show how that culture of debt it’s
different in two countries of Europe, we extract the data for Spain and Germany. 
Figure 5 and 6: Credit to GDP, total credit to the private non-financial sector for Spain
and Germany. Source: www.bis.org
Immediately,  we  can observe with  both  graphs  how the tendencies  in  both
cases are opposite. In Germany the credit expands it over the increase in GDP until
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maximum levels  of  130% in  2004,  from them on decreases since then until  2016,
excepting a little increase in 2008-2009.  The case of Spain is contrary, since 1999 the
credit respect to GDP is increasing year over year, until 2015, coincidentally with the
credit  expansion  of  ECB.  The correlation  between  them show us  a  negative  one,
around -90%, explaining that meanwhile Germany is reducing their credit for avoid the
risk of another crisis, the private sector of Spain continues with the credit expansion, or
at least,  maintains it  at  the same level,  increasing the credit  to GDP. This indicator
explain that the crisis of Spain provoked a big decrease of GDP, not in Germany, so
that’s one of the reasons why the sign of the tendency is contrary, aggravated by the
credit  expansion  in  Spain  or  the  maintenance,  arriving  to  222% in  2015.  The real
economy  is  strongly  dependent  of  the  bank  loans,  and  then,  the  credit  market,
household and the companies are assuming more risk to borrowing,  permitting the
lenders apply higher prices of loans. 
Banks are financing housing in Spain in massive mode since the start of 21th
century. To put in perspective, in the first decade of the century in Spain were build
more houses than Germany, France and England together, achieving almost 1.900.000
new houses in 2006, the highest peak in the history.   Banks permitted finance this
overinvestment in this sector because it was so profitable for them, the interest rate
dropped down with the increase of demand of loans, the developer companies saw an
opportunity to make easy money with a market increasing over year, and investors and
families saw an opportunity for make trade with new houses. This process pushed an
inflationary spiral in the credit housing market, increasing house prices. 
 
Figure 7: Number of new houses in Spain. Source: www.bis.org
Lowering interest make the entrepreneur a wrong idea of the real cost of the
project, making profitable business when they are not. It’s the same with the bubbles.
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The entrepreneur who started to invest in the years previous of crisis pushed by the
benefits of the construction sector received insane benefits, raising again the prices. As
we said before,  the credit  in  the bank system was focused in  invest  the real-state
bubble in Spain, extending credit massively to families, big and small companies. The
case of  the families is extremely strange.  Driven by a scenario of  low interest  and
facility of loans, many families and individual investors saw an opportunity to invest
their savings in a profitable business. Most of these families started to buy second and
third houses in property, and then, sold them to other families who were looking an
opportunity in this business, receiving bonuses of benefit in the transaction because
the prices started to raised up exponentially.  In the graph 7 we can saw the rapidly
increase in the property prices. Taking the prices of 1995 as a 100 base, in September
of 2007 show the maximum level 328% of difference in only 12 years. In other words,
property prices increased more than four times in one decade. To put in perspective,
let compare property prices between Spain and Germany helping us with figure 8. 
Figure 8: Property prices in Spain. Source: www.bis.org
First of all, the tendency is completely opposite between both countries along
the time, except from 2015 henceforth, when the property prices increase for both of
them. Also, in Spain we had a continue increasing of prices since before than 1999
until 2007 when it peak 320%, and then a huge reduction in the value around 200% in
2012,  to  back  up  again  in  the  contrary  direction.  In  Germany,  the  prices  were
maintained lower than the level of 1995 until 2012, taking a great increase of them till a
120% in 2016.  Secondly,  the scale is  completely different.  Meanwhile  in  Spain the
range moves between 100 and 350%, in Germany it’s moving around 90-125%. The
magnitude of that it’s almost 3 times large in Spain than Germany. 
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Figure 9: Property prices in Germany. Source: www.bis.org
In  the  next  graph  we  can  see  how since  2000  the  Spanish  economy  had
suffered a continue increase in the consumer prices practically with a lineal tendency
until 2014, when the prices suffered a little stop. Great part of this lowering in prices is
because  of  the  reduction  in  the  price  of  the  petrol,  underneath  of  30$,  historical
minimums. Once passed this point, prices recovered the upward trend thanks to the
increase in the prices of energy avoiding the risk of deflation, but not the inflation, over
than 2%. Comparing the Spanish data with the consumer prices in Germany, we have
a similar  conclusion in  both cases,  the trend and tendency along the time is  quite
similar. So, the real-state bubble didn’t affected in the price consumption in a different
way between Spain and Germany, because the correlation of them is 98%. That makes
sense  because  the  European  regulation  provokes  that  the  commerce  and  trading
between them and other foreign countries is submitted at the same level of taxation,
provoking that the final prices in both cases had the same tendency in the data, despite
of the final prices are not the same, as the wages and level of wellness it’s not the
same.  
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Figure 10: Consumer prices in Spain. Source: www.bis.org
Figure 11: Consumer prices in Germany. Source: www.bis.org
So, in conclusion, the property prices in Spain increased more than 4 times in
one decade, that’s it, more than 300%, and in Germany prices were constant along the
timeline.  That’s one of the reasons of the appearance of the real-state bubble.  The
inflationary spiral of prices and credit provoked the speculation with the properties with
the conviction of it’s a safety assets and it  won’t  decrease their value. But not only
families rode in the wave of the bubble, companies did it too. It was a huge creation of
construction companies during the first decade of the century, the demand of housing
had increased in over than a million per year, and the supply it couldn’t be supported
by the companies established , giving the opportunity to another companies to enter
into the market to attend the new demand. The increase in prices continued along the
years, and then property developer companies made insane benefits, but it weren’t the
only  one.  In  a  bubble  of  that  dimensions  the  beneficiaries  are  everyone  which
participate in the process suffers the effects of the inflationary spiral. For example, in
our case of real-state bubble, we have lot of indirect beneficiaries in the process, since
the company which sell tiles for the houses, the concrete pavement, the company of
services like water or electricity, the developers saw an increase of the demand, the
banks sending more credit than they can support in actual situations, and of course,
the families  who  saw how Spain  has  become in  the European  country  with  more
private  properties  houses,  with  more  than  80%,  that’s  it,  more  than  80%  of  the
population in Spain has his own house in property, higher than the 60% of average in
Europe. 
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For  all  of  that,  the problem in  our  case it’s  not  the law of  property,  is  how
properties were financed. The abuse of the bank loans gave us a general view of how
the real state bubble was formed in a few years. Over-investment in inflated assets
provoked that household debt double up in less than a decade since 800.000 millions
of  euros  to  1.500.000,  that’s  more  than  net  disposable  income  of  the  country,
concretely a 122% in the 20154. That insane debt, more over than the whole income in
the economy, it will cost decades to pay it, considering not only the full debt, so the
payment of interests. With a labor market still recovered in the pre-bubble levels, the
same as the salaries, the payment of the debt it will be a cost of opportunity too high,
because extract productive resources in the economy and mine the capacity of saving
for the next years or decades in the worst cases.  
Figure 12: Household debt in Spain. Source: www.bis.org
The real-state bubble is the biggest  difference between two rich countries in
Europe, in our case Spain and Germany, why the crisis of 2007 in USA didn’t affected
in the same way. The German austerity and the well actuation of his system banking
permitted the recovering of the crisis in a few years with huge solvency, meanwhile
Spain 10 years after didn’t recovered completely of the consequences, despite of the
necessary reforms. The figure 4 and 5 show us how wrong policy regulations in the
banking system permitted in Spain the over-investment and the excess of credit in the
crisis, taking more risk than the German system. That’s especially true for non-current
bank debt, with a Gini index close to 0.90 that show a high concentration of debt. 
4  See https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-debt.htm
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Figure 13: Gini Index, including all industries. 
So, as we exposed before, the credit excess and the over-investment of families
and companies carry Spain to another path during the years of crisis. But what is the
reason behind  it?  Why the State  permits  the  over-investment  of  their  families  and
companies, taking so much rich and putting in danger the banking system, not only of
the Spain, also the other developed countries? The reason is simple: in our system of
Central  Banks  and  the  fully  control  of  the  monetary  base,  banks  and  States  are
benefited  at  the  expense  of  the  citizens.  It  works  because  the  fractional  reserve
banking permit banks keeping only a small part of their deposits on reserves, not even
close to 100%. That permit banks borrow funds from their depositors, people who save
their money and lend it to the bank keep and save it, and lending to the borrowers, who
are looking for opportunities in the credit market to improve their current liquidity in the
short run. In that process, banks make money thanks to the spread of interest rate
between the actions of borrow and lend. Since here everything is ok, the banks are
making profits thanks the activity of intermediary in the credit market, keeping money of
the savers and lend it to the investors through the interest rate. The problem appears
when the activity of the bank consist in send more credit than the whole reserves. For
example,  for a deposit  of  $10.000 the bank keeps $1.000, and the other $9.000 is
loaned to other person, that deposited it in other bank, that keeps again the 10% of the
deposit in their reserves. If the economy is so bankarised, the money loaned by the
banks soon or later will return in form of deposits by another client, creating something
like money. To understand how it works, we can approximate it with this equation:
Total Money Created = Initial Deposit x (1 / Reserve Requirement)
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Helping us with the before example,  with an initial  deposit  of  $1000 and a 10% of
obligated reserves, we can obtain a total amount of money created of $10.000 only
with the activity of sending loans and receiving deposits of the bank, their essential
activity, acting like intermediary. 
So, banks can create 10 times more money in circulation like their reserves,
what  is  called  ‘the  mechanism  of  creation  of  banking  money’.  The  result  is  the
expansion of money supply in $90.000 with the creation of $10.000, which is 9 times
the amount of deposits. That cycle permits to the economy create a bubble of debt
because banks could send credit over their possibilities without back not only in gold or
silver, even without fiat money, creating the sensation of wealth and false euphoria.5
Figure 14. Expansion stages.
The fractional  reserve banking had flooded the world  economy of  credit,  so
that’s it the reason why nowadays only about a 10% of the whole money in circulation
has supported on cash, the rest 90% are countable numbers in the bank balances.
This system was into question since the implantation of it, and the Currency School of
British  economists  were  who  make  opposed  of  it.  In  1844  in  Great  Britain,  Prime
Minister  Robert  Peel  reformed  the  system  banking  to  end  the  fractional  reserve
banking and introduce the 100 percent money. The Currency School realized in the
5 See Table 1. Stages of monetary expansion. 
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research of the system that Central Bank generates and perpetuates the inflation and
contractions, creating cycles of up and downs in the economy. The Peel’s Bank Act
prohibited  national  banks  to  issue bank  notes  even with  gold  backing,  transferring
these  rights  to  the  Banks  of  England,  acting  like  a  Central  Bank  and  creating  a
monopoly for the issue of money. That measure had positive consequences in theory
because it keeps the creation of money under control and maintained it supported in
real values like gold or silver, but it’s supervised by a Central Bank, in turn supported
by the State, only aggravating the problem of control of the new monopoly.  But the
Peel’s Bank Act forgot apply the 100 percent to the receiver of deposits because it
weren’t considered like money supply like bank notes, but for the payment of banks is
the same action,  receive  a loan (asset)  and send bank notes or  demand deposits
(liability). 
So,  banks  could  send  credit  to  the  families  and  companies  above  their
possibilities because it hasn’t backed in gold or silver. Like we said before, Peel’s Bank
Act was a huge fail  because the continue process of expansion and failure doesn’t
stopped since nowadays. 
This is the base of the theory of the cycle. For the Austrian economists the cycle
is created by the intromission of the Central Bank, because breaks the market process
of fixing rates. This process reveals the intertemporal preferences of the savers and
investors, and the interactions between them fix the real interest of the economy. But
the credit  expansion orchestrated by the Central  Bank push the individuals  to take
another  decisions  that  they don’t  make it  normal  situations,  provoking irremediably
misallocations, and then, the boom and bust, the cycle. 
5.  THE WORLD WITHOUT CENTRAL BANKS AND FRACTIONAL-RESERVE 
BANKING
In  the  point  before,  we  proved  that  the  intervention  in  the  economy of  the
Central  Banks,  manipulating  the  interest  rates  and  the  monetary  supply  creates
perverse incentives in the economy and misallocations of productive resources. But,
what would happen in a non-intervened market? 
5.1 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
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The  Austrian  economists  and  theorists  have  a  debate  trying  to  solve  the
problem  of  Fractional  Reserve  Banking,  although  there  is  no  conclusion  yet.  The
Theorists  of  Liquidity  thinks  that  the  problem could  be solved in  a  system of  free
banking,  and  the  other  part,  supporters  of  100%  of  minimum  reserves,  that  it’s
necessary established the retention of the deposits in the reserves of the bank without
provided to third parties. 
The Theory  of  Liquidity  manifests  that  the  real  problem  behind  the  up  and
downs of the economic cycles is caused by maturity mismatches between savings and
investment in the economy. The manipulation of the interests by Central Banks and the
security of the rescue banking with the injection of liquidity for the recapitalization of the
debts permit taking so much risk. In that moment banks are not required to take a
position of clear solvency and start to emit mortgages for people of doubtful loans. The
key of that theory is the marriage of the assets and liabilities in terms and risk. 
Without  a  Central  Bank,  the  competition  between  banks  in  a  free  banking
system will disciplinary the companies to take less risks and change their philosophy to
have more solvency with a better maturity mismatch, that could permit a recovery plan
for  enhancing  the  finance.  The  problem  with  fractional-reserve  banking  would  be
solved by the interaction between economic agents, because the risk of not paying the
checks could be huge in times of crisis. For the savers who see that their bank can’t
support  the  outlet  of  deposits  is  a  situation  of  panic  that  can  give  as  a  result
bankruptcies  for  the  banks  which  don’t  approximate  their  reserves  to  100%  of
guarantee. So, the tendency in this theory is the approximation to a 100% of reserves
of  deposits  because the probability  of  been caught  practicing  the fractional-reserve
banking is higher with many banks competing every day. The stability of the economy
will be achieved and the cycle would stop caused by the non expansion of the credit
from the scratch. 
Contrary, with the diminution of banks is less probably been caught, because
the number of people in the same bank increases, and few banks can compensate
each other the checks with the mechanism of creation of money, the fractional-reserve.
In the case of only one bank controlling the flow of transactions it’s impossible for the
savers demand that the bank have in their reserves the entire money, because they
don’t have any options to leave another bank because has no competitors. 
The other possibility for the exclusion of the Central Bank in the economy is the
demand of 100% of minimum reserves. The supporters of this theory defend that the
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contract with the bank couldn’t be under fractional-reserve banking because is immoral.
One of the most supporters of that doctrine is the professor Huerta de Soto, and sais in
his book (Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles, 2008): 
“Indeed, the contract of deposit (depositum in Latin) is a contract made in good
faith  by  which  one  person—the  depositor—entrusts  to  another—the  depositary—a
movable good for that person to guard, protect, and return at any moment the depositor
should ask for it. Consequently, the deposit is always carried out in the interest of the
depositor. Its fundamental purpose is the  custody  or  safekeeping  of the good and it
implies,  for  the  duration  of  the  contract,  that  the  complete  availability  of  the  good
remain in favor of the depositor, who may request its return at any moment.”
That’s  the  key  in  the  argument.  The  contract  of  deposit  only  permits  the
protection  and  guard  of  the  good  (in  our  case  money)  and  the  return  when  the
depositor asks for it. 
Nowadays the contracts is so complicated and awkward, to the point of in most
of the cases the depositor it’s not sure of what is signing in the moment of make the
contract. Most of depositors think that their money is insured by the bank, but there
isn’t. That money it’s been used for emit new credit, without support in real money or
any value how we explained before. In essence, using that money for private benefit of
the bank, without any guarantee of bounced or not using it, breaking the essence of the
contract of deposit, the guard and protection without their use. Instead, banks are using
demand deposits like loans, and then there is the fraud, cause of their used. 
In this case, each party doesn’t have the same consideration for the deposit, so
the contract falls in  error in negotio,  providing the deal the absolute invalidity. In the
case that other people knew that signing the contract provided the bank to use their
money, that contract is impossible because the bank can’t ensure the disposition of the
deposit  in  every moment.  And finally,  in  the case of  fractional-reserve banking  the
result is the same, banks can’t provide the assurance of return the money because
there is always in movement. 
In both cases we have a huge problem of clarity of the contracts. And that’s the
main point of view, not the application of the free banking with or without the 100% of
minimum reserves. Although we choose one of the options, the base to put the system
in  practice  with  solvency  is  clarifying  them.  The  contracts  right  now  are  an
entanglement  of  restrictions  and  regulations  that  most  of  the  people  who  sign  the
contract with the banks didn’t know what is really signing. 
In that moment, when the simplification is reached, is time to debate which one
of the option could be better for the operation of the system. Economy is not a pure
science that  we can predict  with  the 100% of  confidence,  and that’s  what  a lot  of
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people think and criticize us, the economists. We don’t know categorically how would
work the implantation of these systems in the current world, because the economy is a
process on millions and millions of people interact each other, not only in the social life
but also in commerce and business, results will improve with trial and error. But what
we know is that Central Banks and the control of the monetary systems indirectly by
the States are not working, and we have to end it. 
6. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
We did a general review of Spanish economy since 1999 year and observed
that the actuation of the ECB had important and decisive consequences in the country.
Like Daniel Lacalle said in ‘Escape from the Central Bank Trap’, the origins of the crisis
in  history  are  always  the same:  the  massive  increase  in  the  in  risk  generated  by
manipulating the amount of price of money, and in our case it was lowering interest
rates artificially. We saw in Figure 3 how ECB manipulated the interest rates dropping it
from 2000 to 2006 when the real state bubble start to form it. Housing was a low risk
investment and banks start the expansion of credit to the families and entrepreneurs
even  with  poor  solvency  ratios,  because  money  was  too cheap  and  the  prices  of
houses continued rising. 
When the defaults appeared in the previous years of crisis, Central Banks come
to scene to protect solvency of the economy through QE, the miracle of growth and
stability. But looking back in 2017, we can ensure that the “unconventional monetary
policies”  like  QE,  doesn’t  work  like  we  expected.  In  words  of  Torsten  Slok,  Chief
international economist at Deutsche Bank, in eight of the twelve cases analyzed the
impact of QE in the economy was negative, in three cases was neutral and the only
country on worked was United States because of the oil  and gas producer,  thanks
fracking. The promise of liquidity, jobs, inflation and growth didn’t work. The incentives
are too big for these poor results.  
Obviously the financial system needs a restructuration and if  the QE doesn’t
have  been  applied  maybe  we  had  right  now a  different  scenario  with  the  system
collapsing. What we need is set the monetary policy aside and focuses on fiscal policy,
and encourages the companies to adopt traditional values of responsibility and free
competition.  With  measures  of  Central  Banks  printing  money,  depreciating  the
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currency, or injecting liquidity beyond the system needs only permits fall again in the
same past mistakes, create a new bubble of free money and huge debt. And the most
punished are the middle class, the savers who lost purchasing power and their wealth,
transferring it to indebtment governments and the financial system.  
Summarizing,  what  we  need  is  to  eliminate  the  monopolies  of  creation  of
money,  the  Central  Banks  cause  the  manipulation  of  the  interest  rates  and  the
emission of money without control and give the market with the interaction between the
economic agents the power  of  decision that  it  should always  had. That  gave as a
scenario of free banking with huge competition between the banks, creating a new
model  on  the  companies  will  adopt  a  model  more  closer  to  a  100% of  minimum
reserves,  to  guarantee the keeping of  money of  their  clients,  or  closer  to a model
according to a the theorists of liquidity,  on the minimum of reserves is opened and
every bank decide the % of assurance, focusing in the maturity mismatch to assure the
solvency and the enough liquidity in the reserves to deal with the diary challenges of
the market. For that, the clarity of the contracts must be adequate for everyone to not
fall in legal frauds. 
And for ending this project I would share this words of Ludwig von Mises in his
book  ‘Geldwertstabilisierung  und  Konjunkturpolitik’,  translated  like  ‘The  Theory  of
Money and Credit’ in 1928 about the trade cycle, boom and busts: 
«The most important prerequisite of any cyclical policy, no matter how modest its goal
may be, is to renounce every attempt to reduce the interest rate, by means of banking
policy, below the rate which develops on the market. That means a return to the theory
of the Currency School, which sought to suppress all future expansion of circulation
credit and thus all further creation of fiduciary media. However, this does not mean a
return to the old Currency School  program, the application  of  which was limited to
banknotes.  Rather  it  means  the  introduction  of  a  new program  based  on  the  old
Currency School theory, but expanded in the light of the present state of knowledge to
include  fiduciary  media  issued  in  the  form of  bank  deposits.  The banks  would  be
obliged at all times to maintain metallic backing for all notes —except for the sum of
those outstanding which are not now covered my metal— equal to the total sum of the
notes issued and bank deposits opened. That would mean a complete reorganization
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of  central  bank  legislation.  By  this  act  alone,  cyclical  policy  would  be  directed  in
earnest toward the elimination of crises. »
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: creation of money with fractional-reserve banking.
Asset
s
Liabilitie
s
[
Reserve
s ]
Tot
al (Required)
(Exces
s)
Loans and Deposit
s
Investments
Reserves 
provided 10,000 1,000 9,000 - 10,000
Exp. Stage 1 10,000 1900 8,100 9,000 19,000
Stage2 10,000 2,710 7,290 17,100 27,100
Stage 3 10,000 3,439 6,561 24,390 34,390
Stage 4 10,000 4,095 5,905 30,951 40,951
Stage 5 10,000 4,686 5,314 36,856 46,856
Stage 6 10,000 5,217 4,783 42,170 52,170
Stage 7 10,000 5,695 4,305 46,953 56,953
Stage 8 10,000 6,126 3,874 51,258 61,258
Stage 9 10,000 6,513 3,487 55,132 65,132
Stage 10 10,000 6,862 3,138 58,619 68,619
... ... ... ... ... ...
Stage 20 10,000 8,906 1,094 79,058 89,058
... ... ... ... ... ...
Final Stage 10,000 10,000 0 90,000 100,000
Table 1. Stages of monetary expansion
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